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ABSTRACT
Inter-municipal cooperation is increasingly popular in European countries.
Saving cost is a key motivation. This paper analyses the relation between
inter-municipal cooperation and cost eﬃciency among Dutch municipal tax
departments between 2005 and 2012. Motivated by the notion that cost
savings are ascribed to scale economies, the relation between cooperation
and cost is modelled explicitly through scale. The size of the cooperation is
incorporated as a determinant of cost eﬃciency. The results indicate that inter-
municipal cooperation can contribute to reducing cost and that the relation
can be explained by scale. Municipalities or cooperations sized around 10,000
inhabitants are estimated up to 30% ineﬃcient. At 60,000 inhabitants, the
beneﬁts of scaling are largely exhausted. Other than through scale, munici-
palities that cooperate are not estimated to operate signiﬁcantly more or less
eﬃcient.
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1. Introduction
Municipalities aim at providing local public services in a cost-eﬃcientmanner. It
is widely recognised thatmany local government services are subject to returns
to scale (Lago-Peñas and Martinez-Vazquez 2013). Fixed cost may drive the
average cost of small municipalities up, while large municipalities may, for
example, require more managerial oversight (Drew, Kortt, and Dollery 2016).
A traditional approach to eﬀectuate economies of scale is through the
consolidation of municipalities (Bel and Warner 2015). Australia and the
Netherlands are among the countries that have seen a substantial decrease
in the number of municipalities since the 1990s. Yet, municipality consolida-
tion is subject to several drawbacks. Most importantly, the current scientiﬁc
consensus is that municipal consolidation has often not led to the
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anticipated decrease in costs (Dollery and Johnson 2005; Drew, Kortt, and
Dollery 2016; Fox and Gurley-Calvez 2006). A similar empirical view arises in
the Netherlands (Allers and Geertsema 2016).
Second, since municipal services and tasks are rather heterogeneous, it is
questionable whether the scaling of one municipality service is also bene-
ﬁcial for another municipality service. Scale eﬀects may vary strongly
between municipal services such as waste collection, civil aﬀairs and tax
collection. There may be no such thing as ‘one size ﬁts all’. The heteroge-
neity of municipality services also highlights the methodological diﬃculty
that comes with the measurement of municipality output. Frequently, out-
put is measured by some measure of population, which may be a rather
poor proxy for overall output (Boyne 1996).
Inter-municipal cooperation is an alternative and relatively understudied
reform (Bel and Warner 2015) through which municipalities can exploit
economies of scale, and its popularity is on the rise in, amongst other
countries, the Netherlands. Inter-municipal cooperation allows for the scal-
ing of municipal services or back oﬃces, beneﬁting from potential econo-
mies of scale and maintaining jurisdictional autonomy.
Based on these experiences, one might wonder whether inter-municipal
cooperations are successful in exploiting economies of scale. An emerging
literature on the matter indicates that cooperation can be eﬀective in
decreasing cost, but there are some contradictory results (for an extensive
and recent overview, see Bel and Warner (2015)). As inter-municipal coop-
eration is often based around speciﬁc services or back oﬃces, it is appro-
priate to analyse these separately. In the past, some authors have followed
this research strategy. Most of the available studies concern waste collection
(Bel and Costas 2006; Bel and Mur 2009; Bel, Fageda, and Mur 2014;
Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2013; Sørensen 2008; Zafra-Gómez et al. 2013). Most
empirical studies that investigate the relation between cooperation and cost
are carried out in western European countries. This paper thus focuses on
the cost-motivated form of cooperation as is popular there.
This paper analyses the relation between inter-municipal cooperation
and cost eﬃciency among Dutch municipal tax departments. The aim of
this paper is to analyse whether inter-municipal cooperation has contribu-
ted to reducing cost here and to analyse how the relation depends on scale.
Motivated by the notion that cost eﬀects of inter-municipal cooperation are
generally ascribed to scale economies, this paper explicitly relates inter-
municipal cooperation to cost through scale. The relation between inter-
municipal cooperation and cost is allowed to vary with the size of the
cooperation so that the assumption on economies of scale can be tested
empirically. In contrast, the more common approach in literature is that the
institutional form in which the activities are organised, such as cooperation,
is included in the model e.g., through dummy variables. This approach boils
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down to the implicit assumption that cooperation inﬂuences cost by a
constant percentage or amount.
The basic model used is a stochastic cost frontier in which costs are
related to outputs and eﬃciency. Cooperation is assumed to aﬀect cost
through two key mechanisms. First, it is assumed that through scale, coop-
eration aﬀects eﬃciency. A distinction is made between the administrative
scale of the municipality tax department and the actual scale of production.
For cooperating municipalities, the scale of production is determined by the
size of their cooperation. For non-cooperating municipalities, there is no
diﬀerence. The scale of production is then included in the model as a
determinant of eﬃciency. Moreover, the model allows for a non-linear
relationship between scale and cost. For example, it is expected that small
municipalities can beneﬁt more from scaling. Second, given some scale of
production, cooperating municipalities may be more or less eﬃcient.
Cooperations may, for example, face coordination costs, decreased transpar-
ency or may not be able to materialise scale eﬀects to their full extent. To
test this hypothesis, a dummy variable is included as well.
The model is applied to an extensive panel data set covering 2005–2012,
comprising data on the administrative cost of taxing and levying and
detailed data on production. Municipal taxation in the Netherlands is a
popular subject for inter-municipal cooperation. The number of municipa-
lities levying taxes through a form of inter-municipal cooperation increased
from 25 out of a total of 467 municipalities in 2005 to 124 out of 415 in
2012. In the context of the Netherlands, this speciﬁcally renders them as an
interesting case for analysis.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant
literature. The methodology is presented in Section 3. Section 4 includes a
description of the data. The results are presented in Section 5. Section 6
contains the discussion and concluding remarks.
2. Literature
This paper is related to literature on the organisation of local governments.
First and foremost, this paper is related to the emerging literature that
speciﬁcally addresses the relation between inter-municipal cooperation
and cost. Second, there is a more general and well-developed strand of
literature on the measurement scale economies in local governments.
2.1. Inter-municipal cooperation and cost
Bel and Warner (2015) provide an up-to-date and extensive discussion of
potential theoretical eﬀects of inter-municipal cooperation on cost and
discuss the emerging evidence on the matter. Importantly, as they note,
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inter-municipal cooperation in EU countries diﬀers from that in the US.
Focus in research of inter-municipal cooperation in the EU is mostly on
economic eﬀects, whereas research on inter-municipal cooperation in the
US is more concerned with regional coordination and externalities. This
paper focuses on the way inter-municipal cooperation is designated in EU
countries.
This paper directly links inter-municipal cooperation to scale. Many
papers have suggested that inter-municipal cooperation may be an eﬀective
reform for exploiting economies of scale (Bish and Ostrom 1973; Parks and
Oakerson 1993; Plata-Díaz et al. 2014). Indeed, scale economies appear to be
the ‘most important eﬃciency motivation for inter-municipal cooperation’
(Bel and Warner 2015). Other recent papers conﬁrm that from an economic
perspective, economies of scale are the most important driver of inter-
municipal cooperation (Plata-Díaz et al. 2014; Warner and Hefetz 2003;
Warner 2006; Zullo 2009).
In addition to scale economies, inter-municipal cooperation may aﬀect
eﬃciency and cost through several additional mechanisms, such as econom-
ics of density and by addressing externalities. Moreover, inter-municipal
cooperation may give rise to transaction and coordination costs (see, e.g.,
Brown and Potoski 2003; Feiock 2007). The degree to which each eﬀect
applies likely depends on the type of service, the scale of production and
institutional design of the cooperative governance arrangement (Bel and
Warner 2015).
Compared to privatisation, empirical evidence on the relation between
inter-municipal cooperation and cost is still rather scarce (Bel and Warner
2015 discuss eight multivariate studies in detail, see p.61; Holzer and Fry
2011). In the past decade, several parametric empirical studies have
emerged, most of them focusing on waste collection (Bel and Costas 2006;
Bel and Mur 2009; Bel, Fageda, and Mur 2014; Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2013;
Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2014; Perez-Lopez, Prior, and Zafra-Gómez 2015; Pérez-
López et al. 2016; Sørensen 2008; Zafra-Gómez et al. 2013). Garrone, Grilli,
and Rousseau (2013) are an exception in that they also study water, elec-
tricity and gas.
It is insightful to discuss some of these papers in more detail. In the
context of Dutch municipalities, Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2013) study the
eﬀects of inter-municipal cooperation in Dutch waste collection on the
total associated cost of municipalities. They ﬁnd that cooperation leads to
cost reduction, although the result is statistically insigniﬁcant. Their analysis
is carried out at the level of the municipality. The eﬀect of inter-municipal
cooperation is modelled by including a dummy variable. In earlier work on
the topic, Bel and Costas (2006) follow a comparable identiﬁcation strategy.
In their study on waste collection costs in Spanish municipalities, they ﬁnd
that inter-municipal cooperation is negatively related to costs. Bel and Mur
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(2009) also use dummy variables to identify the eﬀect of cooperation
(among other aspects) on cost but estimate the model for diﬀerent sub-
samples by size and ﬁnd that small Spanish municipalities decreased waste
collection costs through inter-municipal cooperation. They note that in the
regular cost function, no evidence of scale economies is found because small
municipalities have likely exploited them by means of inter-municipal coopera-
tion. In other words, the eﬀect of cooperation is explicitly characterised by
scale economies. It may thus be insightful to measure and include the scale
of cooperation in the empirical framework to test the assumption on econo-
mies of scale. Bel and Warner (2015) discuss several other papers that focus
on inter-municipal cooperation and cost, which follow comparable identiﬁ-
cation strategies (Sørensen 2008; Zafra-Gómez et al. 2013; Bel, Fageda, and
Mur 2014).
An exception is the analysis of Garrone, Grilli, and Rousseau (2013) on the
impact of inter-municipal joint ventures and other multi-government utili-
ties on the eﬃciency of Italian municipal utilities. Interestingly, they ﬁnd that
scale beneﬁts are outweighed by coordination costs. Garrone, Grilli, and
Rousseau (2013) use multi-utility ﬁrms as the unit of observation instead
of municipalities. Therefore, they also measure the actual scale of produc-
tion. While their focus diﬀers signiﬁcantly from this paper (water, electricity,
gas and waste), their analysis stresses the point that coordination costs may
be an important drawback of cooperation.
Finally, Pérez-López et al. (2016) recently estimated the relation between
eﬃciency and inter-municipal cooperation by means of a meta-frontier
approach. Hence, they can estimate whether, for example, inter-municipal
cooperation or privatisation is better for a certain group of municipalities.
They ﬁnd that in general, cooperation is the most suitable option, but for
municipalities with over 20,000 inhabitants, contracting out leads to higher
eﬃciency levels.
2.2. Local governments and economies of scale
It is widely recognised that many local governments are subject to returns
to scale (Lago-Peñas and Martinez-Vazquez 2013) and there is a large
number of studies that empirically addresses the relation between scale
and (average) cost. An orthodox assumption is that the average cost curve is
‘U-shaped’ (Drew, Kortt, and Dollery 2016). Increasing output when it is still
small may bring down the burden of ﬁxed costs, but at some point, the
increase in, for example, bureaucracy may overtake. These are just two out
of many possible mechanisms driving scale eﬀects. In general, labour-inten-
sive services are relatively less likely to beneﬁt from scaling up as opposed
to capital intensive services and back oﬃce functions (Andrews and Boyne
2011; Drew, Kortt, and Dollery 2016). This particularly holds for labour-
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intensive services that are hard to standardise or where intensive client
contacts are relevant.
Byrnes and Dollery (2002) provide an extensive discussion on many
empirical studies concerning local governments in the UK and USA. As
they note, most studies use population as a measure of scale. Remarkably,
there are a large number of papers that only allows for a linear relationship
between average cost and scale, that is, that assume that average cost is
monotonically in- or decreasing with output.
Several recent studies that study the relation between average cost and
scale allow for a quadratic or non-linear shape of the cost function. Through
the estimation of a quadratic cost function, Drew, Kortt, and Dollery (2016)
also provide evidence for a U-shaped cost curve in Queensland, Australia,
with an optimum around 98,000 inhabitants. Geys, Heinemann, and Kalb
(2007) ﬁnd that German municipalities have signiﬁcant economies of scale
for municipalities up to 10,000 inhabitants. Solé-Ollé and Bosch (2005)
estimate a piecewise linear function for municipalities in Spain and ﬁnd
that the optimal size lies around 5000 inhabitants. Bikker and van der Linde
(2016) study scale economies in local public administration in the
Netherlands using several non-linear functions and ﬁnd that the optimum
size increased from around 49,000 inhabitants in 2005 to 66,260 inhabitants
in 2014.
Andrews and Boyne (2009) study administrative overheads of English
local authorities and ﬁnd that administrative cost monotonically decreases
with size. As they note, it is important to control for local structure or
heterogeneity by incorporating environmental characteristics into the
analysis.
3. Empirical strategy
This paper estimates a stochastic cost frontier for Dutch municipalities
between 2005 and 2012. The frontier identiﬁes eﬃcient municipalities that
minimise cost given their output level and production environment. The
regression representation of the stochastic cost frontier is given by
c ¼ g y;w;q;βð Þ þ v þ u z;δð Þ; u z;δð Þ  0: (1)
In the above equation, c is the log municipality cost of municipality tax
departments, y is a vector of log outputs, w is a vector of log input prices, q
is a vector of log environmental variables, v is an independent identically
distributed random error term and u speciﬁes cost ineﬃciency as a function
of covariates z and parameters δ. The variables included in the model are
discussed in Section 4. Furthermore, g ð Þ is some parametric function para-
meterised by β. By choosing a ﬂexible mathematical speciﬁcation, a cost
frontier approach allows for multiple outputs and can account for multiple
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environmental characteristics. Here, a translog speciﬁcation is used, a more
general function than the Cobb–Douglas speciﬁcation.
The relation between inter-municipal cooperation, scale and cost is mod-
elled as follows. Analysis is conducted at the level of the municipality. That is,
the variables c and in g ð Þ correspond to the observed cost and output of
individual municipalities. This corresponds to an analysis at the administrative
scale level. The actual scale at which a municipality produces is incorporated
as a z variable as a determinant of (in)eﬃciency. For municipalities that are
active in an inter-municipal cooperation, this equals the sum of the total
output of the cooperation. For single municipalities, this is equal to their
individual output. Furthermore, to allow for a U-shaped relation between
scale and ineﬃciency, z also includes a squared scale variable. Hence, output
inﬂuences cost both through g ð Þ and u z;δð Þ. The approach is completed by
imposing constant returns to scale in the cost function g ð Þ. Constant returns
to scale imply that a 1% increase in the output of municipalities increases cost
through g ð Þ by 1%. Scale eﬀects are then isolated in the eﬃciency term, both
for individual municipalities and those active within a cooperation. By also
including a dummy variable for cooperating municipalities, the set-up further-
more allows us to analyse whether municipalities within inter-municipal
cooperations are more or less eﬃcient than individually operating municipa-
lities, under a comparable scale of production.
An additional advantage of this approach is that analysis at the level of the
Decision-Making Unit, the municipality, is preserved. An alternative method that
incorporates the scale of actual production is to analyse at the level of the
cooperationusing aggregatedmunicipality data. Adisadvantageof this approach
is that it sacriﬁces relevant information and requires the aggregation or averaging
of included variables. Furthermore, onemay also want to analyse how the eﬀects
on eﬃciency within an inter-municipal cooperation are dispersed among the
diﬀerent participants in the cooperation or incorporate individual municipality
eﬃciency determinants unrelated to cooperation. Table 1 brieﬂy summarises the
Table 1. Summary of three potential models.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Unit of analysis: Municipality Cooperation Municipality
Mun. 1 Mun. 2 Mun. 1 and 2 Mun. 1 Mun. 2
Cost (c) C1 C2 C1þ2 C1 C2
Output (y) y1 y2 y1þ2 y1 y2
Eﬃciency
determinant (z)
y1þ2 y1þ2 – – –
Scale and eﬃciency
eﬀects: captured
through eﬃciency
component u zð Þ,
constant economies
of scale assumed in
g ð Þ
Scale: captured through
cost function g ð Þ.
Eﬃciency eﬀects
(non-scale): capture
through moderation of
cost function (e.g., by
dummies)
Eﬀects of cooperation:
captured through
moderation of cost
function (e.g., by
dummies)
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proposed model (1), the discussed alternative (2) and the more common
approach (3), in case there are two cooperating municipalities.
Note that u z;δð Þ is not yet speciﬁed. The pioneering SFA models (Aigner,
Lovell, and Schmidt 1977; Meeusen and Van den Broeck 1977) assumed that
u was an independently distributed random variable. Early attempts to
model u conditional on potential determinants z involved so-called two-
step approaches in which estimates of u were regressed on z in a second
stage. It is now widely recognised that this is bad practice leading to invalid
inference (Wang and Schmidt 2002).
The alternative proposed here is to estimate (1) in a single-step proce-
dure that is based on the so-called scaling property (Alvarez et al. 2006;
Simar, Lovell, and Vanden Eeckaut 1994; Wang and Schmidt 2002). It is said
that the model satisﬁes the scaling property if u z;δð Þ can be written as
u z;δð Þ ¼ h z;δð Þ  u;
where h z;δð Þ  0 and u  0 is a random variable which distribution does not
depend on z. The scaling property implies that the shape of the distribution of u
does not depend on z, but that the scale of the distribution of u is determined
by the scaling function h z;δð Þ. One convenient advantage of the scaling
property is that in order to estimate the model, no distributional assumptions
on the basic variable u are required, which normally is a common criticism of
SFA models (see, e.g., Wang and Schmidt 2002; Schmidt 2011). It holds that
E cjy;w;q; zð Þ ¼ g y;w;q;βð Þ þ h z;δð Þμ (2)
where μ; E uð Þ. The parameters β; δ and μ can then be estimated using
non-linear least squares (NLLS). Taking expectations of u gives
E uð Þ ¼ h z;δð Þ  E μð Þ;
so that replacing δ and μ by their estimates δ^ and bμ gives the expected
value of u. Note that inference cannot be conducted on the random (stochastic)
part of ineﬃciency, that is, u, without imposing distributional assumptions.
The model furthermore does not impose a structural time-varying trend on the
eﬃciency component. If there is no intertemporal variation in the eﬃciency
determinants for a municipality, ineﬃciency is assumed to remain constant.
An appealing candidate for the scaling function is the exponential func-
tion h z;δð Þ ¼ expðz0δÞ. This function always generates positive values (as it
should). Here, the scaling function is deﬁned as the sum of two exponential
functions, one that incorporates the variables relating to scale, and one
relating to the coordination costs that arise from cooperation:
h z;δð Þ ¼ exp z01δ1ð Þ þ exp z02δ2ð Þð Þμ: (3)
In words, it is assumed that the relation between coordination and eﬃciency
is independent of scale, that is, the loss in eﬃciency due to coordination is
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not related to scale. The motivation for this choice is that it seems reason-
able to assume that coordination eﬀects occur independent of scale.
4. Data
The main data used in this study are sourced from Statistics Netherlands, the
national Dutch statistical agency. Information on municipal tax rates was
obtained from the Centre for Research on Local Government Economics.
Information on the composition of inter-municipal cooperations has been
obtained from the Association of Dutch Municipalities, the Council of Real
Estate Assessment (in Dutch: Waarderingskamer) and by inspection of coop-
eration agreements or inquiries.
The data cover the period 2005–2012. Dutch municipalities typically set
up a designated department that performs tax-associated tasks, which
operates reasonably independent from other municipality departments
and services. Due to municipal consolidations, the number of municipalities
in the Netherlands decreased from 467 in 2005 to 415 in 2012. In total, 3116
observations are included in the analysis. Municipalities with negative
reported cost or worryingly high intertemporal variation were systematically
dropped from the analysis. This resulted in the omission of approximately
250 observations. A statistical description of the data that are ﬁnally
included in the model for the year 2012 is given in Table 2.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics, 2012 (N = 373).
Variable Mean
Std.
dev. Minimum Maximum
INPUT VARIABLE
COST (IN MILLIONS OF EUROS) 0.96 3.07 0.04 49.28
OUTPUT VARIABLES
HOUSING PROPERTIES 17,625 30,861 445 390,454
NON-HOUSING PROPERTIES 3099 4025 188 459,66
TAXED TOURIST NIGHTS
(TOURIST TAX REVENUE/TOURIST TAX RATE)
249,686 629,067 1102 8,778,888
IMPOSED DOG TAXES
(DOG TAX REVENUE/DOG TAX RATE)
2318 2981 194 29,180
ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES
AVERAGE PROPERTY VALUE (IN EUROS) 251,078 63,884 133,000 630,000
PROPERTY TAX RATE (IN %) 2.62 0.63 1.06 4.98
SINGLE-PERSON HOUSEHOLDS/TOTAL HOUSEHOLDS 0.30 0.06 0.19 0.60
NET PROPERTY TAX RETURNSa 0.94 0.03 0.78 1.10
WELFARE RECIPIENTS 918 3262 10 40,870
EFFICIENCY DETERMINANTS
ACTUAL SCALE OF PRODUCTION (BY NUMBER OF
PROPERTIES)
45,825 66,508 1084 450,307
MUNICIPALITIES IN COOPERATION (%) 26
COOPERATION WITH WATER AUTHORITY (%) 11
aSome values exceed one due to using predicted tax returns and minor measurement errors.
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4.1. Tax departments and cooperations
Dutch municipal tax departments carry out two primary tasks. First, munici-
palities impose and levy several taxes and fees. In terms of revenues, the
main taxes are a real estate or property tax (43% of municipal tax revenues)
and the waste collection and sewerage fees (41%). The remaining 16% are
related to tourist taxes, dog taxes and other smaller taxes. Second, Dutch
municipalities are obliged to perform an annual revaluation of all real estate
properties. Valuation of real estate properties is generally based on property
characteristics, market prices of recently listed properties in the vicinity and
other possibly relevant demographic information. Municipalities inform
property owners of the valuation assessment and the property value is
then utilised as a basis for taxation. Note that the diﬀerence between
taxes and fees is not important for the purpose of this analysis.
The number of municipalities that levy taxes through a form of inter-
municipal cooperation increased from 25 out of a total of 467 municipalities
in 2005 to 124 out of 415 in 2012, while the number of inter-municipal
cooperations increased from 3 in 2005 to 29 in 2012. Between 2005 and
2012, the percentage of total cost incurred by cooperations increased from
1% to 35%. Inter-municipal cooperations diﬀer in size. While the smallest
consists of only two municipalities, the largest is composed of more than 20
municipalities. Figure 1 presents a geographic overview of the cooperations
(panel a) and the actual scale of production per municipality (panel b) in
2012, measured by the number of properties.
Figure 1. (a) Inter-municipal cooperations in 2012. (b) Actual scale of production per
municipality in 2012.
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4.2. Cost and input price variables
The dependent variable in the cost function analysis is the (log) cost level of
municipality tax departments. Between 2005 and 2012, nominal costs
increased from roughly 360 to 380 million euros. The costs are composed
of mainly labour, IT and oﬃce supply costs. While municipal tax depart-
ments are a popular subject for inter-municipal cooperation, their relevance
in terms of cost is limited (less than 1% of total municipality cost).
In terms of input prices, only the consumer price index is included. Dutch
municipalities face largely equal input prices (Bikker and van der Linde 2016)
as wages are collectively set and the purchase of other inputs such as oﬃce
supplies is done on national markets. The cost of capital (e.g., housing) may
vary but these are not relevant here, as municipalities report housing costs
separately. In the analysis, costs are eﬀectively deﬂated using the consumer
price index, which is invariant between municipalities.
4.3. Output measures
The clear majority of local government studies measure output by popula-
tion count. While there is a large strand of literature that carefully studies
the methodological sensitivity in measuring scale economies (for a recent
analysis, see Bikker and van der Linde 2016), it has proven diﬃcult to ﬁnd
consistent better aggregate output measures of local government produc-
tion (Andrews and Boyne 2009). Studies of speciﬁc municipality services or
back oﬃces typically have used more accurate measures of output. For
example, analyses of waste collection services have seen output measures
used such as the quantity of waste collected (e.g., Bel and Costas 2006;
Zafra-Gómez et al. 2013) in addition to or as replacement of population
measures.
For municipal tax departments, there is no comparable literature avail-
able to draw output measures from. Recall that Dutch tax departments carry
out two primary tasks: the imposition and collection of several taxes and
fees and the (re)assessment of all real estate property value. Finally, four
output variables are included (1) the number of housing properties, (2) the
number of non-housing properties, (3) the number of taxed tourist nights
and (4) the number of imposed dog taxes. The motivation for these mea-
sures is discussed below.
Ideally, the output of the taxation task is deﬁned as the number of the
imposed and processed tax assessments, by type. There are however no
data available that directly measure this. In terms of revenue, the most
important are the real-estate tax (43%) and waste collection and sewerage
fees (41%). Although revenues are known, they oﬀer no suitable output
measures as tariﬀs vary among municipalities. Higher tariﬀs lead to higher
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revenues but not to more administrative eﬀorts. The number of real-estate
properties is known at the municipality level, an accurate proxy for the
number of levied real-estate taxes. The number of real-estate properties is
also used to proxy the number of levied waste collection fees. Although
these are usually levied at the level of households, these correlate strongly
with properties.
The next two important taxes are the tourist tax and dog tax (together
3% of revenues). These may source some heterogeneity as not all munici-
palities levy tourist taxes and/or tourist fees and as tourism varies strongly
between municipalities. Tourism is an often overlooked but important
source of municipal heterogeneity (Bel and Costas (2006) discuss this in
the context of waste collection). Dutch municipalities typically levy tourist
taxes per tourist night. The tourist tax revenue is used as a proxy for the
number of levied tourist taxes. The revenues are divided by the prevailing
tax rate. This measure is equal to the number of taxed tourist nights.
Following the same line of reasoning, the dog tax revenues are divided by
the dog tax rate to proxy the number of levied dog taxes.
The second primary task of tax departments is the valuation of all real-
estate properties. This output can also be measured by the number of
properties. On average, it requires fewer resources to perform valuation of
more common properties such as ﬂat apartments than of more heteroge-
neous properties such as schools and hospitals. One distinction that is
available in the data is between housing and non-housing properties. Both
are included separately in the model. Finally, the ﬁrst two output measures
(housing and non-housing properties) then measure both the output of the
valuation process and a part of the taxation process (real-estate tax).
4.4. Variables in the eﬃciency component
The cost eﬃciency component includes ﬁve variables that all relate to scale
and cooperation characteristics. The ﬁrst two and most important variables
relate to scale: (1) the scale of services measured by the total number of
properties and (2) the square of (1) to allow for an (inversely) U-shaped
eﬀect, that is, to allow for a shift from increasing to decreasing economies of
scale at some point (and to allow for the existence of a tipping scale or
optimum scale). These scale variables express the actual level of production.
Thus, for municipalities in an inter-municipal cooperation, (1) is equal to the
sum of total cooperation output, while for single municipalities, it equals the
individual output of the municipality. The production (y) variables on the
other hand always relate to the individual municipality output.
The third, fourth and ﬁfth managerial variables are dummy variables that
indicate (3) whether a municipality participates in the cooperation (coordi-
nation costs), (4) if a water authority is included in the cooperation (vertical
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integration eliminates the need for double administrative systems) and (5)
whether it is a municipality’s ﬁrst year in a cooperation (transition or start-up
costs).
Finally, recall that h z;δð Þ ¼ exp z01δ1ð Þ þ exp z02δ2ð Þð Þμ. The scale variables
(1) and (2) make up z1 while (3), (4) and (5) are included in z2.
4.5. Environmental variables
Exogenous variables may inﬂuence the cost level through the production
environment. The eﬀorts to levy taxes may depend on the municipality’s
socio-economic, demographic or ﬁscal characteristics. Variables included are
(1) the average value of properties; (2) the municipal property tax rate (in %),
(3) the number of welfare beneﬁt recipients, (4) the ratio of single house-
holds to the total number of households and (5) the net property tax returns
(i.e., the percentage of the imposed property taxes that are successfully
collected). As the literature on the economies of municipality tax collection
agencies is rather scarce, not all variables are justiﬁed by literature but
haven arisen from interviews held with civil servants employed in munici-
pality tax departments.
Expensive properties are on average less homogeneous and thus require
more eﬀort to valuate. To control for this, the average value of properties is
included as an additional measure (Bikker and van der Linde (2016) also
include this to account for municipality heterogeneity).
As discussed in Section 4.2, the waste collection fee is typically collected
per household. Although strongly correlated with the number of properties,
in municipalities with a relatively high number of single-person households,
this may lead to a bias. The relative number of single-person households to
total households in the municipality is therefore included.
Inhabitants of a municipality may fail to pay some or all the imposed
taxes. This requires municipalities to exert more eﬀort to collect the taxes,
for example, by engaging bailiﬀs. The degree to which a municipality
succeeds in collecting the total property income (tax rate multiplied by
total property value) can be interpreted as a measure of quality of the
levying process. To control for this, the net property tax returns (in %),
that is, the percentage of the total imposed property tax collected, are
included. This percentage may also vary due to environmental variables,
such as income level and other factors, for which a correction is made by a
separate single OLS regression.
Also, the number of welfare recipients is included in the model, as low
incomes are more likely to appeal for tax exemption. Also, municipalities will
more likely have to send more repeated requests for payments or ﬁnes. It is
expected that this drives average cost up.
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A ﬁnal potential important cost driver is the number of submitted
appeals. Inhabitants may ﬁle an appeal if they disagree, for example, with
the valuation report or the tax assessment, and the handling of such an
objection is rather expensive. The returns of a successful appeal are higher if
the property tax rate is higher. This motivates including the average prop-
erty tax rate.
4.6. Technological and institutional changes
IT innovations play an important role in the administrative processes for
taxation, as valuation is increasingly done with automatised software.
Therefore, an annual trend parameter is included in the speciﬁcation. The
estimated parameter of the annual trend (2005–2012) reﬂects the average
annual percentage change in cost due to these technological changes.
5. Results
5.1. General
The main results are presented in Table 3. The results are obtained by
regressing the log cost of municipalities on output, environmental charac-
teristics and ineﬃciency determinants, that is, by estimation of Equation (2)
with NLLS. All (continuous) variables have been centred on their arithmetic
mean. Panel-robust (White) standard errors are computed as the convoluted
regression error is heteroskedastic by deﬁnition (Parmeter and Kumbhakar
2014).
The ﬁrst-order output parameters (b1; b2; b3; b4) have plausible (positive)
signs. The third parameter is estimated signiﬁcant only at a 10% signiﬁcance
level and fourth output parameter (dog taxes) is not estimated signiﬁcantly.
The fourth output (dog tax) is small in magnitude and not as a big a source
of heterogeneity. Note that most cross terms are estimated insigniﬁcant as
well. A simpler Cobb–Douglas formulation with no cross terms is however
rejected by a LR test. Note furthermore that constant returns to scale have
been imposed: the ﬁrst-order and second-order parameter sum to, respec-
tively, one and zero.
One way to evaluate the plausibility of the estimates is to inspect the
marginal cost with respect to every distinct product. The marginal costs are
computed for the average (in terms of environmental characteristics) and
cost-eﬃcient municipality. These are reasonable: the marginal cost in euros
equal 40 and 63 euros for levying taxes on and the valuation of, respectively,
a housing and non-housing property, while the marginal cost of levying a
tourist tax (per night) and dog tax equal, respectively, 0.11 and 13 euros.
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5.2. The relation between scale, eﬃciency and inter-municipal
cooperation
Next, consider the parameter estimates of the eﬃciency component u. A
negative (positive) sign here implies a positive (negative) relationship with
eﬃciency, as u denotes cost ineﬃciency. Recall that cooperation enters the
model in two ways. First, the actual scale of production for cooperating
municipalities, which is included as a determinant of eﬃciency, exceeds
their administrative scale. Second, a dummy variable is included to test
whether, given some scale, cooperations are signiﬁcantly more or less
eﬃcient. There is evidence of economies of scale as the parameters of the
actual scale of production and the squared actual scale of production
variables are estimated signiﬁcantly. Furthermore, the parameters indicate
a U-shaped relation between ineﬃciency and scale, as the parameters are
estimated positive and negative, respectively. The optimum scale is esti-
mated at 226,961  9:757= 2  0:985ð Þ  45; 825ð Þ real-estate properties. This
roughly corresponds to 450,000 inhabitants (on average, there are two
Table 3. Model estimates (N = 3116).
Variable Parameter Estimate
Std.
Error T-value
HOUSING PROPERTIES b1 0.736 0.062 11.805***
NON-HOUSING PROPERTIES b2 0.203 0.058 3.483***
TAXED TOURIST NIGHTS b3 0.029 0.017 1.712*
IMPOSED DOG TAXES b4 0.032 0.029 1.102
HOUSING PROPERTIES × HOUSING PROPERTIES b11 0.136 0.126 1.076
HOUSING PROPERTIES × NON-HOUSING PROPERTIES b12 −0.128 0.131 −0.980
HOUSING PROPERTIES × TAXED TOURIST NIGHTS b13 −0.014 0.024 −0.596
HOUSING PROPERTIES × IMPOSED DOG TAXES b14 0.007 0.036 0.188
NON-HOUSING PROPERTIES × NON-HOUSING
PROPERTIES
b22 0.171 0.142 1.202
NON-HOUSING PROPERTIES × TAXED TOURIST NIGHTS b23 0.000 0.025 0.002
NON-HOUSING PROPERTIES × IMPOSED DOG TAXES b24 −0.043 0.036 −1.183
TAXED TOURIST NIGHTS × TAXED TOURIST NIGHTS b33 0.009 0.007 1.340
TAXED TOURIST NIGHTS × IMPOSED DOG TAXES b34 0.006 0.007 0.851
IMPOSED DOG TAXES × IMPOSED DOG TAXES b44 0.030 0.026 1.167
AUTONOMOUS COST GROWTH g0 −0.031 0.004 −7.064***
AVERAGE PROPERTY VALUE g1 0.390 0.079 4.935***
PROPERTY TAX RATE (IN %) g2 0.105 0.042 2.518**
SINGLE HOUSEHOLDS/TOTAL HOUSEHOLDS g3 0.113 0.107 1.058
NET PROPERTY TAX RETURNS g4 0.703 0.331 2.126**
WELFARE RECIPIENTS g5 0.095 0.029 3.320***
MEAN INEFFICIENCY PARAMETER u* 1.016 0.227 4.469***
FUNCTIONAL SCALE d1 −9.757 2.467 −3.955***
FUNCTIONAL SCALE × FUNCTIONAL SCALE d2 0.985 0.249 3.957***
DUMMY: IN COOPERATION d3 −0.052 0.057 0.905
DUMMY: IN COOPERATION WITH WATER AUTHORITY d4 −0.197 0.116 −1.695*
DUMMY: FIRST YEAR IN COOPERATION d5 0.239 0.077 3.118***
LOG LIKELIHOOD −1552.42
R2 0.813
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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inhabitants per property). Below (above) this point, production is charac-
terised by (dis)economies of scale. In the Dutch context, this is rather large;
as such, the estimate should be interpreted more as a careful indication than
an accurate point estimate. The tipping point is extrapolated from mostly
smaller municipalities; only a few in the sample exceed this size.
The most important point to take from the scale parameters is that scale
eﬀects are pronounced especially for municipalities or cooperations with
less than roughly 30,000 properties; the decrease in cost eﬃciency after this
point is virtually non-existent. Figure 2 graphs the estimated relation
between expected eﬃciency and scale for under 50,000 properties. Hence,
despite the estimated large optimum size, economies of scale are deﬁned
mainly for smaller municipalities.
Now consider the estimated dummy variable. Remarkably, other than
through scale, cost eﬃciency is not signiﬁcantly associated with coopera-
tion. Hence, there is no evidence of signiﬁcant coordination costs. The point
estimate is even slightly negative (cooperation is associated with higher
eﬃciency). Importantly, note that in case scale eﬀects were persistent only
for non-cooperating municipalities, this parameter would have taken a
positive and larger value.
To illustrate the estimated relation between scale and cost, the parameter
estimates can be used to predict cost levels. Table 4 presents some simula-
tions of municipalities that decide to scale their production through inter-
municipal cooperation. The simulations suggest that the cost-saving eﬀects
Figure 2. Estimated relation between scale and cost eﬃciency.
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are more pronounced (percentagewise) for smaller municipalities. Two
municipalities, each currently sized at 5000 properties, are estimated to
save up to 20% by cooperating. Two larger municipalities, sized at 10,000
properties each, can expect to save 10% through cooperation. For average
to larger municipalities, scale eﬀects have exhausted.
Municipalities that collaborate with a water authority are estimated more
eﬃcient. Cooperation between municipalities and water authorities implies
the discontinuation of some of the activities that were previously dupli-
cated, such as administering duplicate address databases. Finally, the ﬁrst
year a municipality levies through inter-municipal cooperation is associated
with a temporary loss in eﬃciency.
Finally, autonomous productivity growth is deduced from the change in
costs over time, corrected for changes in production and all other control
variables. Costs decreased by 3.1% a year on average. One plausible expla-
nation is that the valuation of properties is becoming less and less expensive
as more and more automated software is used.
6. Discussion and conclusion
This paper analysed the relation between inter-municipal cooperation, scale
and cost eﬃciency in Dutch municipal tax departments. In the Netherlands,
tax collection is a popular subject for inter-municipal cooperation. The
results indicate that inter-municipal cooperation is related to lower cost
and that the relation can be explained by scale. Economies of scale are
particularly pronounced at small levels of production. A scale of 5000
properties (roughly 10,000 inhabitants) is associated with 30% cost ineﬃ-
ciency. The beneﬁts diminish with scale and are largely exhausted at 30,000
properties (roughly 60,000 inhabitants).
Remarkably, no signiﬁcant association between inter-municipal coopera-
tion and cost eﬃciency was found other than through scale, for example,
Table 4. Predicted scale eﬀects.
Ex-ante scale of
production (in
properties)
Percentage of Dutch municipalities
operating at a lower scale of production
in 2012
Increase of actual
scale of production
towards
Estimated
cost
reduction
(%)
5000 5 10,000 20.4
20,000 28.9
50,000 29.8
10,000 25 20,000 10.3
50,000 11.8
100,000 11.8
25,000 60 50,000 0.6
75,000 0.7
100,000 0.7
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through coordination and transaction costs, except for a temporary down-
ward shock of eﬃciency in the ﬁrst year, a municipality is active in a
cooperation. Although non-signiﬁcant, cooperating municipalities are, sur-
prisingly, associated with a slightly higher cost eﬃciency. One factor that
may contribute here is that cooperations are not as susceptible to political
inference from a single municipality. In addition, tax collection is a relatively
low-complexity and standardised task, which may limit the required coordi-
nation between cooperating municipalities.
Municipalities do seem to incur extra cost for setting up or joining a
cooperation initially. Work processes between diﬀerent municipalities have
to be integrated and personnel have to be relocated. Additionally, munici-
palities that cooperate with water authorities are more eﬃcient. This is
expected, as it removes the duplicate maintenance of rather similar admin-
istrative systems.
Inter-municipal cooperation is becoming an increasingly common phe-
nomenon in European countries, and its popularity in the Netherlands is on
the rise as well. In many western European countries, cooperation is moti-
vated by cost savings. Often, cooperations focus on a speciﬁc municipal
service, task or output, such as waste collection, road maintenance or social
services. In the Netherlands, municipalities can be active in tens of diﬀerent
cooperations. From a scale perspective, inter-municipal cooperation then
oﬀers tailored scaling of services that may beneﬁt from it. Existing literature
on inter-municipal cooperation conﬁrms that cooperation may contribute to
reducing cost and, generally, the eﬀects are ascribed to scale economies. So
far, most empirical studies on EU inter-municipal cooperation and cost
concern waste collection.
A practical implication of the results is that by scaling production,
cooperation can be eﬀective in decreasing cost, especially for smaller
municipalities. It should be stressed however that the results do not
easily generalise to other municipality services, as both scale and coor-
dination eﬀects likely vary. Further research on the relation between
inter-municipal cooperation, scale and cost eﬃciency in other services
may help in shed light on what factors determine the feasibility of inter-
municipal cooperation to reduce cost. More generally, analysis of spe-
ciﬁc services may also be useful to decompose overall municipality scale
eﬀects. Examples of potential determinants that drive scale and coordi-
nation eﬀects include the size of ﬁxed cost, labour intensity, task com-
plexity and the level of standardisation in the delivery of the service
between municipalities (see also Bel and Warner 2015). In the case of
Dutch tax departments, task complexity is low and there is a high
degree of standardisation driven by legal requirements. Coordination
requirements are therefore likely limited and scale eﬀects are plausible.
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Finally, it should be noted that inter-municipal cooperation has also
been subject to criticism: cooperation goes at the expense of democratic
legitimacy, and municipalities that are active in dozens of cooperations
become less transparent, while they may also incur increased overall
administrative burdens, for example, in overall municipality management.
Such eﬀects remain unclear when focusing on a single municipal service, as
the costs of other services and general municipal management are not
included. Moreover, little is still known about the relation between inter-
municipal cooperation and the quality of service delivery. Future research
on the relationship between ﬂexible structures of inter-municipal coopera-
tion, eﬃciency and the quality of service delivery is therefore desirable to
uncover these relations in more detail.
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